Which Gulf exporters can bypass Hormuz, and how much capacity is actually usable?
Drawing pipelines on a map is not enough: a real alternative needs spare capacity, connection, a terminal and workable logistics.
There is no single “alternative route”
Alternatives to Hormuz are an uneven combination of pipelines, terminals and port capacity. Saudi Arabia can move crude from the east to Yanbu on the Red Sea. The UAE has a connection to Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. Iran built the Goreh–Jask route, but utilisation has been limited. These systems do not replicate Hormuz: they move only part of crude flows, not the full mix of oil, products, LNG and general cargo crossing the Strait.
| Exporter | Outlet avoiding Hormuz | What it moves | Main limit |
|---|---|---|---|
| Saudi Arabia | Petroline to Yanbu | Crude oil | Available capacity is smaller than total regional exports. |
| United Arab Emirates | Abu Dhabi–Fujairah pipeline | Crude oil | Does not replace LNG or other producers’ traffic. |
| Iran | Goreh–Jask | Crude oil | Limited historical use and low effective throughput. |
| Iraq, Kuwait and Bahrain | No fully equivalent operational outlet | Primary Gulf dependence | Need foreign infrastructure or maritime transit through Hormuz. |
| Qatar | No equivalent physical LNG route | LNG | Commercial swaps do not replace LNG-carrier passage. |
Nameplate capacity is not usable capacity
A pipeline may have a technical maximum, but usable capacity depends on existing throughput, maintenance, pumping stations, crude quality, storage and terminal loading capacity. That is why the IEA provides a 3.5–5.5 mb/d range of potential redirection rather than one guaranteed number.
In-house calculation: the structural gap
Against 20 mb/d of crude and products moving through Hormuz, the high end of the bypass range would cover about 27.5%; the low end, 17.5%. Even under the most favourable assumption, a gap of at least 14.5 mb/d remains. This does not forecast losses; it demonstrates that alternative infrastructure cannot reproduce the whole system.
Potential bypass versus Hormuz flow
Why LNG is the most rigid case
LNG requires liquefaction plants, tanks, loading berths and specialised carriers. It cannot be diverted through a crude pipeline. Qatar can reorganise contracts or swap cargoes with other sellers, but commercial arrangements do not create physical capacity on the outer Gulf coast. A prolonged disruption would affect global LNG volumes, regional prices and competition between Asia and Europe.
What makes an alternative operational
A route is a genuine alternative only when four conditions are met: spare capacity, continuity from field or storage, an available terminal, and prepared buyers and logistics. A pipeline map without those four elements can overstate resilience.
Why spare capacity cannot be treated as a switch
Even when a pipeline has unused theoretical capacity, moving extra barrels requires a chain of operational decisions. Producers must nominate volumes, adjust field and storage flows, schedule pumping, reserve tanks at the destination and secure terminal and tanker slots. Those steps can compete with cargoes already planned through the same system. A sudden crisis can therefore create a delay between the political decision to divert crude and the physical loading of additional exports.
Quality also matters. Different grades cannot always be mixed without affecting refinery value, and a receiving terminal may not have the tank segregation or blending capacity required for every producer. This is why a map of pipelines should be read as infrastructure potential, not as proof that a specific number of barrels can be redirected immediately.
How this analysis was produced
- Byline
- Estrecho Ormuz Editorial Team.
- Method
- Synthesis of primary sources, comparison of magnitudes and clearly labelled in-house calculations.
- Review
- Document review completed on 4 August 2026. Updated when source data materially change.
- Corrections
- Corrections policy and log.