How much energy actually moves through the Strait of Hormuz?
A comparison of EIA and IEA data that separates global consumption, seaborne trade, crude, LNG and alternative capacity.
One large number can describe different things
Statements that “one fifth of the world’s oil” passes through Hormuz often mix three denominators: global petroleum-liquids consumption, seaborne oil trade and crude-oil trade. The EIA estimated about 20 million barrels per day in 2024, equivalent to roughly 20% of global petroleum-liquids consumption. Using 2025 data, the IEA describes a similar flow as about 25% of global seaborne oil trade. The figures are not contradictory; they compare the flow with different totals.
What the 20 million barrels per day include
The figure combines crude oil and petroleum products. The IEA puts crude at nearly 15 mb/d, around one third of global crude trade. The remainder consists of refined products and other liquids. This distinction matters because disruption affects refineries needing specific grades, distributors of finished fuels and markets able to substitute cargoes in different ways.
Frequently confused magnitudes
Scale is relative to total flow. Bypass capacity is a potential range, not guaranteed immediate throughput.
Why Asia carries most of the exposure
The IEA says around 80% of the oil crossing the Strait is destined for Asia. China and India together received 44% of the crude moving through Hormuz in 2025. Japan and South Korea are also materially exposed. Europe receives a much smaller direct share of regional crude, but it is not insulated: oil is priced globally, so lost supply raises prices, freight and substitution costs even for buyers that do not receive those barrels directly.
LNG changes the scale of the problem
Hormuz is not only an oil chokepoint. The IEA estimates that about 93% of Qatar’s LNG exports and 96% of the UAE’s LNG exports pass through the Strait. Together they represent about 19% of global LNG trade. Unlike some Saudi and Emirati crude, which can use pipelines to alternative ports, Qatari LNG has no equivalent physical route around Hormuz.
In-house calculation: how much flow lacks an equivalent exit
Comparing 20 mb/d of oil flow with the IEA’s 3.5–5.5 mb/d range of potential bypass capacity suggests that 72.5% to 82.5% could not be replaced by those routes even if capacity were immediately available and fully used. This is an order-of-magnitude calculation, not an operational forecast: effective capacity, crude quality, port access and logistics can reduce real substitution.
How to use these figures without exaggeration
A temporary fall in vessel transits does not automatically remove 20 mb/d from the market. Ships may delay departures, wait at anchor, change windows or use coordinated routes. Estimating impact requires a distinction between normal flow, observed flow, affected cargo, duration and response capacity. That is why the monitor does not convert a single headline into a global-loss estimate.
How this analysis was produced
- Byline
- Estrecho Ormuz Editorial Team.
- Method
- Synthesis of primary sources, comparison of magnitudes and clearly labelled in-house calculations.
- Review
- Document review completed on 4 August 2026. Updated when source data materially change.
- Corrections
- Corrections policy and log.