What alternative routes exist if the Strait of Hormuz closes, and how much can they carry?

1. The central problem is the gap in scale

Close to 20 million barrels per day of crude, condensate and petroleum products moved through the Strait in 2025. The EIA put the first-half 2025 average at 20.9 million b/d, while the IEA calculated 19.87 million b/d for the full year.

Estimated available bypass capacity is only around 3.5–5.5 million b/d. Even at the top of that range, most normal cargoes would still lack an alternative outlet. Nameplate capacity is not the same as sustainable throughput: pumping, storage, crude blending, terminals and ship-loading capacity must all work simultaneously.

2. Saudi Arabia: the East–West Pipeline to Yanbu

The largest bypass is the Abqaiq–Yanbu system, also known as the East–West Pipeline or Petroline. It crosses Saudi Arabia from the eastern producing region to Yanbu on the Red Sea. Its historic design capacity is about 5 million b/d. Aramco reported an increase to 7 million b/d in March 2025, although the IEA notes that sustained operation at that level has not been robustly tested.

In early 2026, usage was estimated at roughly 2 million b/d. That would leave about 3–5 million b/d of spare capacity, depending on operating conditions and the ability of west-coast export terminals to handle additional flows.

This route mainly benefits Saudi crude. It does not by itself create an outlet for Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain or most Iraqi crude. It also shifts rather than removes maritime exposure: after loading at Yanbu, cargoes may still need to transit the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb and Suez, or sail around Africa.

3. United Arab Emirates: ADCOP to Fujairah

The Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline runs roughly 400 kilometres from Habshan to Fujairah. Its key advantage is that it ends on the Gulf of Oman, outside the Strait, allowing part of UAE crude exports to avoid Hormuz.

The IEA puts current capacity close to 1.8 million b/d. About 1.1 million b/d is normally used, leaving room for up to roughly 700,000 b/d of additional flows. This is meaningful for the UAE but small relative to the regional total.

The EIA reports UAE plans to expand export capacity toward Fujairah. Future projects should not be counted as capacity available today until construction, connection, testing and sustained commercial operation are complete.

4. Iran: Goreh–Jask exists, but is not a reliable large-scale alternative

Iran built the Goreh–Jask pipeline and an export terminal at Jask outside Hormuz. Announced nameplate capacity reached 1 million b/d, but observed effective capacity has been much lower. The EIA places it near 300,000 b/d, and the IEA does not currently regard the system as a viable large-scale commercial export route.

An initial cargo was loaded in 2021 and later activity remained limited. It would therefore be misleading to add the full nominal figure when calculating practical bypass capacity.

5. Iraq and other links: partial options, not a regional solution

Iraq can export some volumes toward the Mediterranean through networks connecting to Türkiye and Ceyhan when infrastructure, agreements and internal links are operational. Other regional connections have also been used or proposed. These routes do not automatically replace southern Iraqi terminals or reroute oil from other Gulf producers.

Their usefulness depends on internal connectivity, contracts, security, maintenance and port capacity. They may complement exports for particular volumes but cannot absorb aggregate Hormuz traffic.

6. Nameplate, spare and effective capacity are different concepts

During a crisis, the relevant number is the additional flow that can be sustained for days or weeks, not the theoretical maximum of an isolated pipe.

7. LNG has no equivalent outlet

More than 110 billion cubic metres of LNG crossed Hormuz in 2025, close to one fifth of global LNG trade. Most originates in Qatar, whose liquefaction plants and terminals are inside the Gulf.

A regional gas pipeline does not replace an LNG export chain. The gas would need to reach another coast, be liquefied in available facilities and loaded onto LNG carriers. No alternative infrastructure exists at the required scale. The IEA explicitly states that there are no alternative routes capable of bringing these volumes to market.

A prolonged closure may therefore be harder to cushion for LNG than for part of Saudi or Emirati crude exports.

8. Crude pipelines do not replace products, LPG and petrochemicals

Nearly 5 million b/d of petroleum products crossed Hormuz in 2025. A crude pipeline cannot automatically carry gasoline, diesel, jet fuel, naphtha, LPG or condensates with different specifications.

Saudi Arabia has a parallel natural-gas-liquids pipeline with capacity of about 300,000 b/d, but the IEA says it is fully utilised. Practical flexibility for refined products is therefore much lower than headline crude-pipeline capacity.

9. Bottlenecks remain beyond the pipeline

• Pumping and power. Stations must sustain higher flows.
• Storage. Origin and destination tanks need sufficient space and turnover.
• Crude quality. Mixing streams may alter specifications and contracts.
• Terminals. Berths, loading arms, draught and schedules limit exports.
• Available tankers. Ships must reposition toward Yanbu or Fujairah.
• New maritime routes. Diversion changes distance, insurance, time and geographic risk.
• Contracts and buyers. Cargoes cannot always change port and destination immediately.

10. Which producers can actually benefit?

Pipeline capacity is not shared automatically across exporters. These systems connect particular fields, networks and terminals. A neighbouring country cannot simply use them without physical interconnections and commercial agreements.

11. The longer the disruption, the more visible the limits become

For a few hours, inventories and delays may absorb much of the effect. Over several days, producers accelerate available rerouting, reposition ships and fill storage. Over weeks, alternative pipelines and terminals approach their limits while countries without a bypass must cut production as tanks fill.

Alternative capacity buys time and reduces the deficit; it does not eliminate the disruption. Its strategic value lies in preventing every barrel from being blocked, not in replacing the Strait completely.

12. The correct reading: partial relief, not replacement

Saudi and UAE routes are the only operational large-scale alternatives and can keep several million barrels per day outside Hormuz. They protect part of regional exports and help stabilise markets.

Most normal flows would still lack an equivalent outlet. Qatari LNG, much of the refined-product trade and exports from several countries remain dependent on the Strait. The right question is therefore not only how much nameplate capacity exists, but how much spare throughput is available, for which product, for how long and from which producer.

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