A closure announcement, a ship completing a passage and a sharp fall in cargo flows can belong to the same story. They appear contradictory when all three are asked to answer a single question: “Is Hormuz open?” The announcement concerns a decision or a threat. A documented voyage concerns a vessel, route and time. Energy flows describe how much volume is estimated to have passed through the corridor over a period. Moving between these forms of evidence without saying so also changes what the conclusion means.
This analysis separates those scales and quantifies the third. We recalculate the complete oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) series in table 4 of the EIA's Global Energy Security Data. We do not reconstruct vessel tracks or investigate a particular political statement here. The evidence matrix sets out research criteria, not newly confirmed events.
The announcement, the voyage and the commercial service
A declared closure requires an attributable statement: who issued it, when, which waters it covers and what it says will be restricted. Its authenticity and possible legal effect are different questions from its practical enforcement. A news headline alone establishes none of those points.
Confirmed passage requires evidence of a complete transit within the route and interval being examined. A single AIS position may place a ship near the strait without showing that it crossed. Even a well-documented voyage only contradicts absolute physical impassability within its own scope; it does not establish equivalent access for other vessels or at other times.
An effective closure needs a definition first. Are we investigating a physical barrier in a particular stretch or the interruption of a service for a type of cargo? A claim of total physical blockage would require operational evidence with adequate coverage of that area and interval. Assessing commercial operation also requires regularity, volume, access, delays and risk conditions. “A ship can pass” and “a supply chain can be sustained” are different findings.
An evidence matrix that keeps the question clear
| Claim | Evidence to gather | What it can support | What it cannot establish |
|---|---|---|---|
| Declared closure | Original statement, issuer, date and scope | An attributable announcement with that content | Implementation or a particular legal effect |
| Confirmed passage | Complete voyage, checked identity, route and interval; sources with known coverage | That the passage occurred within its documented scope | Regularity, access for everyone or total volume transported |
| Total physical blockage | Defined area and interval; operational evidence with adequate coverage | Physical impassability within that scope, if supported by the evidence | That AIS silence or missing reports establish an absence of ships |
| Commercial operation | Comparable volume, access, frequency, delay and risk series | Continuity of the defined service | That one passage or a volume average proves normality |
The 2026 decline has a starting point
Reading all six quarters avoids treating two endpoints as a complete account. Total oil here includes crude oil, condensate and petroleum products. During 2025, it rises from 20.9 to 21.6 million barrels per day, a calculated increase of 3.3%. LNG falls from 11.7 to 10.5 billion cubic feet per day, a decline of 10.3%. The corridor did not have a single energy trajectory even before the 2026 contraction.
In 2026 Q1, the estimates reach 14.9 for oil and 7.4 for LNG, about 31.0% and 29.5% below the previous quarter. In Q2, they fall to 4.9 and 0.8. That second quarter-to-quarter decline is 67.1% for oil and 89.2% for LNG. These compare averages; they are not percentages of days closed or ships missing.
Absolute volumes on separate axes
| Quarter | Oil (million b/d) | LNG (billion ft³/d) | Oil index | LNG index |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 Q1 | 20.9 | 11.7 | 96.8 | 111.4 |
| 2025 Q2 | 21.0 | 11.0 | 97.2 | 104.8 |
| 2025 Q3 | 21.3 | 10.9 | 98.6 | 103.8 |
| 2025 Q4 | 21.6 | 10.5 | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| 2026 Q1 | 14.9 | 7.4 | 69.0 | 70.5 |
| 2026 Q2 | 4.9 | 0.8 | 22.7 | 7.6 |
The EIA attributes the table to its analysis of Vortexa tanker-tracking data. Its methodology explains that it supplements incomplete AIS information with route and port analysis and warns of frequent revisions to 2026 Hormuz volumes. We therefore treat the figures as historical estimates from an identified release, not observatory measurements or an immutable daily series.
Comparing proportions without adding oil and gas units
Setting 2025 Q4 to 100 for each series makes their relative paths comparable without mixing physical units. In 2026 Q2, the oil index is 22.7 and the LNG index 7.6. Those levels yield declines of 77.3% and 92.4%. They do not mean that 77.3% of ships stopped passing, and adding the two percentages does not produce a combined measure of energy lost.
Indices with 2025 Q4 = 100
The baseline must be explicit: we use the quarter immediately before 2026, not a technical capacity or a proven normal level. As a cross-check, starting in 2025 Q1 instead produces declines to 2026 Q2 of 76.6% for oil and 93.2% for LNG. The exact percentages change, but the limited finding holds: both estimates fall substantially and LNG contracts more in relative terms. Six quarters cannot separate seasonality, production decisions, demand, security and other factors.
Why one voyage does not settle the assessment
A voyage is measured as a vessel movement. The EIA table is measured as average daily volume over a quarter. Linking the two requires information missing here: vessel numbers and sizes, actual cargo, direction, frequency and observation coverage. A positive volume estimate cannot identify the ships behind it. One observed vessel cannot establish the period's total volume either.
The IMO's Hormuz information page presents another unit: average daily transits in both directions, assembled from several sources for general awareness. We extract neither its charts nor its counts here. Differences in unit and frequency prevent either that indicator or the EIA series from automatically replacing the other.
The observatory's first archive analysis distinguished decision records from vessel observations. We preserve that distinction: these quarterly means do not fill the monitor's missing traffic fields or retrospectively validate its classifications. The monitor methodology retains its own criteria.
What a business should ask next
Observatory interpretation; no new quantified impacts.
For logistics, the next question is whether a passage can be repeated on a predictable schedule. If departures were irregular, one successful delivery would not secure the next supply. Schedules, waiting times and replacement capacity would be needed alongside reports of individual passages.
For insurance, the issue would be which cover is available for the particular cargo, ship and voyage. Physical navigability does not determine a premium or establish acceptable contract terms for every operator. We have not examined policies, quotes or claims and assign no costs to risk here.
For energy supply chains, a lower average volume through this route calls for an investigation of stocks, alternative deliveries and demand before concluding that final users face a shortage. Without that additional balance, a fall at Hormuz is not an equal loss of global consumption. Nor does it directly forecast prices, Spanish fuel costs or inflation.
The useful question has three parts
When a closure is reported, ask: what was announced, which passage was documented, and what volume was estimated—for whom and over which period? The historical series answers only the third part. Its decline matters when assessing commercial continuity, but it cannot turn an announcement into a physical barrier or one voyage into normal operation. A useful assessment keeps all three answers, with their dates and scope, rather than forcing them into a single label.